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Abstract. Community orientated policing is widely held as the relatively new and 
interesting philosophy for Latvian policing. For the fifteen years the community policing 
movement has been gaining momentum acquiring the support of politicians, reformers, 
and the society. Unfortunately there are problems that continually plague the philosophy 
of community policing. Some of the largest obstacles that police organizations face with 
the community policing program are the initial implementation and understanding of 
community policing, the ability to change and adapt to the new format of policing, and the 
acceptance. 
As part  reform programs, State police of Latvia seek to introduce community policing. 
There is no clear or consistent definition of what constitutes a community policing 
programme. However, most community policing initiatives aim to improve relations 
between the police and residents, engage community members or civic organizations in 
evaluation of police services, and expand information sharing. Community policing control 
activities are not always linked to police reform initiatives; somestimes the two activities 
occur simultaneously in isolation on each other. There have been more increasing attempts 
to link or find synergies between control initiatives and realised programs, especially 
(community-based) weapons collection programs and disarmament and demobilization 
projects. Policing reform has been a rather neglected area of security sector reform that 
has been addressed on an ad hoc basis. Some analysts see the need to reduce the number of 
firearms in circulation as a way to improve public security, and thus training in the 
management of safeguarding police stockpiles, keeping accurate inventories of weapons 
and appropriate weapons handling need to be reinforced. 
Public safety cannot be taken for granted. It can only be achieved not only through the 
professionalism of our finest, but through successful collaboration with their neighboring 
counterparts as well. They all deserve our respect and gratitude, and not calumny and 
frivolous criticisms. 
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Introduction 
 
 Community policing includes many aspects. It is important to attain 
high quality of work and provide opportunities for every institution to 
contribute in fighting against many crimes in border area and border 
communities and more important to better employ the provided measures 
for prevention. This will contribute towards the increase of the efficiency to 
combat crime, decreasing crime and corruption, increasing legal certainty 
and the public’s confidence in the administration of justice and, 
consequently, improving the conditions for attracting foreign investments. 
This will increase the quality of police work and duties so as the police 
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would be in a position to perform through appropriate practice of the police 
functions: preventive, reactive and repressive, which should only be used in 
preventive purposes better maintenance of public peace and order and re-
establishment of violated public peace and order will also have  cross 
border impact especially during the international sport and other public 
events with high risk. 
The aim of the article is to reflect problems of reducing the level of 
insecurity and improving safety in a community as one of the primary 
objectives of community policing.  
The tasks: 
1) to analyse problems of cross-border crime situation; 
2) to reflect security measures; 
3) to research cooperation between police and community. 
However, citizens will only be willing to hand over illicit firearms in 
their possession if they perceive an improvement in the public safety and 
security and if they have a certain degree of trust in the police and other 
law enforcement agencies. Community policing is regarded by many donors 
as a gateway to help build confidence and improve the relationship 
between local law enforcement officials and the community. 
Community policing control activities are not always linked to police 
reform initiatives; somestimes the two activities occur simultaneously in 
isolation on each other. There have been more increasing attempts to link 
or find synergies between control initiatives and realised programs, 
especially (community-based) weapons collection programs and 
disarmament and demobilization projects. Policing reform has been a 
rather neglected area of security sector reform that has been addressed on 
an ad hoc basis. Some analysts see the need to reduce the number of 
firearms in circulation as a way to improve public security, and thus 
training in the management of safeguarding police stockpiles, keeping 
accurate inventories of weapons and appropriate weapons handling need 
to be reinforced. 
 
Characterization of border area community and community 
policing problems 
 
While some view the success of the European Union politics as an 
example of the potential positive impact of private citizens at the border, 
others remain concerned that such activities verge on vigilantism. Concerns 
also remain that these volunteers are assuming significant safety and 
liability risks. However, it is not unheard of for private citizens to assist in 
vital government functions. In border communities, citizen's arrest laws 
exist, allowing an ordinary person to make an arrest if he or she has 
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personally witnessed a felony. While citizen's arrest laws vary from state to 
state, what is important is their significance: European laws recognize that 
ordinary citizens can help the government enforce the law. Using citizens at 
the border can produce a multitude of benefits, as demonstrated by the 
success of the European Union border’s politics. Citizens can protect 
property from crime, deter drug sales, and act as additional community 
policing in border communities-allowing law enforcement and Border 
Patrol quards the leeway to focus on intercepting drug shipments and 
catching potential offenders. Critics of citizen involvement at the border are 
rightfully concerned with the safety and liability ramifications of these 
activities. A volunteer attempting to apprehend a trespasser on his or her 
property could be harmed without proper training and guidance. 
Minimizing these concerns requires a certain level of organization and 
accountability, which can be achieved through accreditation, official 
standards, and practical employment concepts consistent with volunteer 
service. The best way would be to encourage states to organize State 
Defense Forces, volunteer organizations dedicated to assisting the federal 
government in a number of activities, including border control. These 
forces report to and are funded by state governments, are governed by state 
law, and report to the governor. Such an organization allows State Defense 
Forces to use state military resources, such as armories and training sites, 
while requiring states to provide training and other resources to 
volunteers. Encourage private-sector investment in border infrastructure. 
The best means by which to tackle border infrastructure problems is 
through investment by the private sector. Not only would this save 
government resources, it would allow the private sector to use its 
knowledge and creativity to design border infrastructure that is commerce-
friendly without jeopardizing security or sovereignty. The government can 
encourage the private sector to take these steps in a number of ways, for 
example, by expanding the protections of the increasing crime level by 
safety documentst which includes liability protection for private-sector 
entities investing in and marketing new technologies that increase border’s 
community safety.  
We need allow flexibility with homeland security grants. More robust 
community policing should be a key component of a smart border strategy. 
Community policing is a "collaboration between the police and the 
community that identifies and solves problems" in a proactive manner. It 
helps to deter the types of crime at the border, not to enforce federal 
immigration laws. Deterring this criminal activity will in turn make the 
federal government's challenge of policing the border more manageable. 
European Union should allow states and cities participating in join law to 
use funds from homeland security grants to provide community policing at 
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the border, including overtime for state and local law enforcement agents 
assisting in federal immigration enforcement investigations. 
 An effective border strategy cannot focus exclusively on land borders. 
As land borders become more secure, drug smugglers and human 
traffickers will quickly look to sea options. Maritime security efforts must 
be enhanced in conjunction with land security. The Coast Guard acts as the 
law enforcement for the high seas, however, it lacks the resources and 
capacities to do its job as effectively as it could. 
 
Cross-border crime and police work 
 
In a world where all crime is local, cross-border criminal mobility and 
cross-border crimes would be limited to a fairly small corridor around the 
borders between countries. The limited action radius of offenders would 
prevent them from committing crimes farther than a few kilometers 
beyond the border into a neighboring country. In a world where all crime is 
perpetrated by itinerant offenders who face few mobility restrictions, 
borders would not have any effect on where offenders travel to, or on 
where cross-border crimes are perpetrated. The world we live in is 
probably situated somewhere in between these two extremes, but we do 
not precisely know where. This lack of knowledge could hopefully be 
decreased by systematic empirical research on criminal mobility and cross-
border crime. 
Most empirical work on the mobility of offenders supports a sedentary 
offender model. According to this model, offenders restrict their criminal 
activities to their local environment, i.e., to the area around their place of 
residence. Even ‘commuters’ (Canter and Larkin, 1993), offenders that 
commit crimes away from their home environment, usually do not travel 
very far. Empirical studies of the home-crime distance (sometimes referred 
to as ‘journey-tocrime’ studies) have demonstrated time and again that this 
distance is generally short (e.g., Wiles and Costello, 2000; Snook, 2004; 
Levine and Lee, 2013). Furthermore, the journey to crime is subject to 
distance decay, i.e., the frequency of crimes decreases with the distance 
from home. The implication of these findings is that offenders who commit 
multiple crimes will generally commit these crimes within fairly limited 
geographical boundaries. The findings on distance decay and short home-
crime distances have been criticized as being methodological artifacts of the 
tendency of most researchers to analyze police records from a 3 single city 
or region, which results in biased findings because such records generally 
underestimate crimes that local offenders commit outside the city or region, 
and certainly do not reveal any crimes committed abroad (Polišenská, 
2008; Van Daele, 2008; Van Daele et al., 2012; Vandeviver, 2013). The 
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nomadic offender model describes the behavior of offenders who have no 
long-term fixed residence, who travel and perpetrate crime in groups, who 
commit mainly nonviolent property crimes at high rates and in multiple 
countries, and who travel frequently in groups over long distances. The 
term “mobile banditry” was adopted by the Council of the European Union 
(5 November 2010) to describe the activities of such groups. Recent 
empirical work in Belgium (Van Daele and Vander Beken, 2010; Van Daele 
et al., 2012) and in The Netherlands (Siegel, 2014) describes the activities 
of offender groups that originate from Eastern and Central Europe in terms 
of this nomadic offender model. In fact, the nomadic model has not been 
applied outside Europe and outside the context of mobility of criminals 
from East- and Central-Europe to West-Europe. Note that the main criminal 
activities attributed to these nomadic offender groups are quite different 
from the activities attributed to traditional ‘organized crime groups’ that 
specialize in illegal cross-border trafficking of goods and people (Kleemans 
and de Poot, 2008). Cross-border crime is a global problem that needs to be 
addressed, and in the European Union, for example, this problem is seen as 
being so serious that the Parliament has been asked to priorities relations 
with all member countries by continuing to support fighting of 
transnational crime through capacity building while improving citizen 
security. It is also stated that European Union has to face a complex matrix 
of national security concerns and crimes ranging from drugs, human 
trafficking and problems of homicide and violent crime in the ungoverned 
space. All member countries reports that in addressing border issues the 
governments needs front-burner policies that will deal with a growing 
diversity of interests in that region and the current resource constraints. 
The policies should identify key strategic priorities in strengthening ties 
with other countries, seek to promote changes in third countires, and 
should help fight organized crime. Crime level has created strong tensions 
within villages and with other neighbouring villages, where people no 
longer welcome visitors because of fear that the visitors may be spying or 
are thieves themselves. People are also afraid to share their issues of 
concern in case they anger fellow villagers who might invite offenders. This 
has created serious mistrust among villagers. The relationship between 
neighbouring villages has also soured as they may perceive each other as 
crimes leading to movement between villages becoming difficult. This has 
created hostility and led to fights over grazing sites and trespassing. 
In some areas, erecting fences is the best way to tackle the illegal-entry 
problem. But the cost makes it important to use fencing only in areas with a 
low "melting point." The melting point is the time it takes for an individual 
to cross the border and "melt" into a landscape unnoticed. In urban border 
communities, spending money on physical barriers makes sense because 
50 
 
individuals can easily cross the border and sneak quickly into the urban 
landscape (for example, one can hide in a building or steal a car and drive 
away). 
The main barrier to overcome was the overall public perception of the 
police service as a merely suppressive power under the control of the State. 
Crime was seen as an exclusive governmental issue.  
We need to remember that the content of the policies that the criminal 
policy is meant to support is not clear or has overriding political 
importance. Usually criminal policies in the economic sphere are meant to 
help secure support for governmental regulatory policies of economic 
activities. Main policies that are not clearly defined have a negative impact 
on law enforcement since it is not clear what is protected or why, e.g. highly 
differentiated import levies. Similarly, if the main policies are very political 
in nature, e.g. certain subsidies programmes to companies to stimulate 
economic activity in a certain direction, the policy makers want the positive 
effects to be visible, not the possible abuses. This situation may be 
recognized by declarations of officials such as `the amount of fraud involved 
is only marginal compared to the advantages of the policies executed'. 
Though unclarity of the policy or its highly political nature are quite 
dissimilar, the bottom line is the same: policy makers do not want the main 
policies to be disturbed by criminal policies nor by information about the 
things that go wrong. - Either the criminal policy or the responsibilities for 
that policy are unclear. If a policy has no clear objectives, information does 
not help much. Similarly if it is not clear who is responsible for those 
objectives, a criminal policy is not easily made operational or put into 
action. If the criminal policy or the policy responsibility is not clear, 
knowledge to improve the policies is neither used nor sought. Comments 
that may betray this somewhat unclear situation are the following: “we are 
still shaping our criminal policy”, “there are a number of committees at 
work and we want to wait for their reports”, “we are dependent on another 
department so we cannot act on our own”.  The criminal policy is of a 
minimalist kind. When the criminal justice system is meant to do no more 
than react in a minimalist manner in those cases that come to light, the need 
for information or the use of it is minimal as well. Take for example a simple 
retributive system that simply hands down a sanction that is proportional 
to guilt or damage in the individual case. In such a context it is immaterial 
whether there are more criminal cases to be discovered, or whether 
alternative approaches may produce better effects. All that matters is a 
formally appropriate response. Apart from confirming or not whether this 
is the case, information has little to add to the shaping or evaluating of such 
a policy. Key comments that cut off further investigation are of the type of 
community policing success or bad luck. 
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Even though we may know reasonably accurately the number of 
terrorist attacks, it may be hard to be sure how many of them involve cross-
border liaison, and the amount of terrorist-related activity - extortion, 
narco-terrorism, fraud - certainly is unknown. In the case of burglary, 
robbery, vice, white-collar crime, and even (before 1990) frauds against the 
European Community, cross-border crimes simply merge into the general 
(and often unilluminating) statistics of recorded crime. This does not mean 
that nothing can be said about these phenomena. It means that 
transnational crime cannot be presented and tabulated in the same way as 
can crimes occurring within the borders of the individual European states. 
Indeed, even if we were to tabulate data on cross-border crime, much of it 
would be highly speculative and not amenable to the sort of household 
surveys that produced the European victimization data. Drug enforcement 
authorities, for example, have an interest in maximizing public concern 
about a problem by focusing on “new” drug epidemics; and those who wish 
to do something about fraud and money-laundering may be tempted to 
generate large figures to “demonstrate” the scale of the problem. There is 
an almost total absence of any available or even readily collectable 
systematic data from policing agencies on cross-border crime, particularly 
where information is sought on which countries are involved. However 
competent their work is on an individual case level, very little appears to be 
known even by specialist squads about patterns of criminal trading 
overseas. It is no accident that the best and most systematic data in this 
article come from my exploratory analysis of private sector information on 
credit card fraud, for these firms have developed hard data on patterns of 
victimization in order to try to cut down on their commercial losses. 
Criminal policy never flows automatically out of empirical data or even 
from intelligence analysis: there is always a political dimension to it. 
However, without knowing more about the dynamics of international 
criminal enterprise, it is hard for policy makers to forecast sensibly what 
the optimal practical European response to it should be, even if there were 
consensus about whether cannabis should be controlled or rates 
harmonized. Policy-making inevitably is based on shifting empirical sands 
of information about how much crime there is and how it is being 
organized, but it might be helpful if we knew whether the foundations of 
our knowledge were dry and stable or were quicksand. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Despite the fact that legal cooperation between the four places needs 
further strengthening, their respective police forces have been quick to 
benefit from information gleaned from one another. For instance, in more 
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countries than ever before mainland police have been setting up auxiliary 
police along the community policing model. Also there has been further 
valuable input from the printed word. The police in many mainland cities 
have been writing articles for their various police journals to share their 
ideas on crime control, investigation methods and skills, evidence collection 
and the possible adaptation of effective foreign policing techniques. It could 
even be suggested that the modernization of mainland police has become a 
silent revolution that contributes immensely to the regional success in 
controlling cross-border crime. 
Supporters of state and local participation in border security 
emphasize that European Union needs to do more to integrate state and 
local governments into the planning and execution of border strategy 
because these governments are much more familiar with the on-the-ground 
realities at the border and bring valuable knowledge of local culture, 
customs, geography, politics, and threats to the community. Local 
governments enforce housing violations and police departments recover 
stolen cars, often cutting off smuggling and drug-trade avenues. Others 
argue that since state and locals often end up footing the bill for illegal 
immigrants, these governments should have an opportunity to engage in 
decision making at the border. 
As can be seen, public safety cannot be taken for granted. It can only be 
achieved not only through the professionalism of our finest, but through 
successful collaboration with their neighboring counterparts as well. They 
all deserve our respect and gratitude, and not calumny and frivolous 
criticisms. 
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